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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

11 March 2014

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Safeguards

Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

2. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the technical cooperation programme of IAEA as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute.

3. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

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4. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty.

5. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim to:

(a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

(b) Provide baseline data regarding fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(c) Strictly observe the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In this connection, the Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

8. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations. In this regard, the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any *ultra vires* acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with its statute.

9. With respect to financial aspects of the safeguards, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by member States of IAEA should be recognized and respected by the Agency in its work.

10. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores also that the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities, needs to be strictly observed.

11. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.

12. In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the implementation of IAEA resolution GC(57)/RES/13, on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency at its fifty-seventh session, in which the General Conference, "Stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements", acknowledged "the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information", accordingly urged the Director General "to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information", and requested that he "continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information".

13. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the necessity of reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards being factual and technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.

14. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA statute, including article XII, which outlines the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and, in particular, that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency's inspectors.

15. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.

16. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be "in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing ...".

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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Regional issues: Middle East

Working paper presented by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, the Group is of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones does not substitute legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group further welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and, in this regard, strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

2. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty. The Group recalls that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

3. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines furthermore that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference. The Conference also stressed that the Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved, and that the Resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. The Group recalls also that, at the Conference, States parties renewed their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

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4. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference, by taking note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

5. In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the adoption by consensus of a detailed plan of action on the Middle East, particularly the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, and urges the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene and exert utmost efforts in ensuring the success of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.[1] While recalling that the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Group stresses the importance of the full implementation of the plan of action and the active and constructive engagement by all parties concerned to allow for the success of the conference in leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses deep concern over the long delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and urges the three co-sponsors of the Resolution to fulfil their responsibility in taking all necessary measures to fully implement it without any further delay.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and over the delay in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, all of which are objectives and priorities that were stressed in Review Conferences of the Treaty in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

8. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains gravely concerned by the statement made by the then Prime Minister of Israel on 11 December 2006, in which he publicly admitted the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel. In this regard, the Group reaffirms the continued validity of the statement of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement on this subject, as contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/19.

9. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further expresses great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which pose a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and

[1] Participation in the conference is not meant to constitute the definition of the "Middle East", except for the purpose of the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

condemns Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. The Group also reaffirms that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

10. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has neither joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East.

11. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.

12. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

13. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer, by any State, of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, the Group expresses its serious concern over Israeli scientists' continued access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State, which has potentially serious negative implications on the security of the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.

14. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms once again its determination to extend fullest cooperation and to exert utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons.

15. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and giving all speakers the full opportunity to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences stipulated that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and

other interested States, should report through the Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference, as well as the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group further recalls that the 2010 Review Conference requested the facilitator to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

16. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the importance of submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 conference. It is essential that the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference conduct substantive discussions on the above-mentioned reports and evaluate the fulfilment of the commitments on the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

17. Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

18. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a standing committee comprising members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee.

19. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that, as clearly stipulated by the 2010 Review Conference, the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction should have been convened in the year 2012. In the First and Second Sessions of the Preparatory Committee in 2012 and 2013, the Group warned that any further delay in convening the 2012 conference would seriously jeopardize the overall implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions and would represent a major setback in this regard. Likewise, the Group underscored that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the convening of a successful 2012 conference are integral and essential parts of the implementation of the consensus "conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions" of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

20. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also emphasizes, as it did in the First and Second Sessions of the Preparatory Committee, the importance of the mandated responsibility of the Secretary-General and the commitments and special responsibility of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution regarding the convening of the 2012 conference. Accordingly, the Group calls upon them to accelerate their efforts to ensure the convening, without any further delay, of a successful conference. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the facilitator to exert

maximum efforts for more intensive and regular consultations and coordination, in accordance with the mandate of the 2010 Review Conference, with all States of the region on all aspects of the 2012 conference.

21. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses once again the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the obligations and commitments of the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, to implement the Resolution. Moreover, the Group considers the implementation of the practical steps adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Middle East as a collective responsibility, since the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference had clearly stipulated that the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation, and also underlined the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

22. While appreciating the constructive engagement and the positive reactions from all Arab countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the Conference, including the announcement of their willingness to participate in the Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty deplores that Israel continues to undermine the convening of the Conference by not declaring its intention to participate in it.

23. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while appreciating the efforts made by the facilitator, Mr. Jaakko Laajava, and the host Government of the 2012 conference, Finland, expresses profound disappointment over the failure of Conveners to convene the conference in 2012 as scheduled. The failure to convene the conference in 2012 contradicts and violates the collective agreement of the States parties contained in "Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions" adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty and contravenes the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Furthermore, the Group strongly rejects the alleged impediments cited by Conveners for not convening the conference on schedule, and expresses serious concern that the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty is meeting while the Conference has not been convened yet.

24. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges the Conveners — the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Russian Federation — in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, to convene the Conference without any further delay in order to avoid any negative repercussions on the credibility of the Treaty, its 2015 Review process and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. The Group calls on the facilitator to intensify consultations with all capitals in the region and to exert maximum efforts to that end.

25. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that efforts, by the Conveners and the Facilitator, related to the Conference should be undertaken in accordance with the mandate contained in "Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions" adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, and should be focused on convening the Conference at the earliest date

in 2014 and on seeking out in advance, by the Conveners and the Facilitator of the Conference, credible assurances regarding the unconditional participation of Israel, the only country of the region that has not declared its participation in the Conference.

26. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. The Group is also of the view that the Conference should lead, without further delay, to the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and to preserve the credibility of the Treaty.

27. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is determined to continue pursuing, as a matter of high priority, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV of the "Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions" of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group urges all States parties, in this session of the Preparatory Committee, to shoulder their responsibility in order to prevent further negative repercussions of not implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and section IV, including the convening of the Conference, as mandated by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

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Nuclear testing

Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the only way to rid the world of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this regard, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

2. While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites. In this regard, the Group is of the firm view that all States parties that have not yet done so should close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development, and also refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear weapon tests in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

3. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group expresses grave concern at the nuclear weapon tests in alternative ways and the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons systems, as well as the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat

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the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.

4. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

5. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 183 States and its ratification by 161 States. In this context, the ratification by Iraq is welcomed. The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards their total elimination.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States Signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, would be only through accession of the non-parties to this instrument. The universality of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

8. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and its not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.

9. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear tests for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.

10. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute the entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.

11. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.

12. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear weapons programmes, including, where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas. In this regard, the Group acknowledges the existence of a special responsibility towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations Trust Territories who have been adversely affected as a result of the nuclear weapon tests conducted in the past.

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The inalienable right to develop research, production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) emphasizes once more the significance of article IV of the Treaty on the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty, the realization of which constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. The Group stresses that, as stipulated in that article, nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this inalienable right. The Group further underscores the importance of promoting international cooperation, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty, for the full realization of this inherent right and strongly calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to fully fulfil their legal obligations to respect this inalienable right and its full realization.

2. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further reaffirms the importance of the right of all States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group stresses the importance of full compliance with the obligations under article IV (2) of the Treaty, which stipulates that Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

3. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the NPT plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group also firmly believes that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of the inalienable rights under article IV of the Treaty, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States

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parties, in contravention with the Treaty's object and purpose, and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in this field.

4. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mandates the Agency, in support of the full realization of the inalienable right under article IV of the NPT, to make provision, in accordance with the statute, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, particularly developed States, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.

5. In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology. The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socioeconomic development. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications would contribute, in an important way, to meeting energy needs, improving human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources and optimizing industrial processes. The Group further highlights that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, would contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs. The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in 2005, IAEA and its then-Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, and reiterates the importance it attaches to the impartiality, professionalism and integrity of the Agency. While expressing its full confidence in that impartiality and professionalism, the Group strongly rejects any attempt by any State to politicize the work of the Agency, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute, as well as any pressure or interference in its activities that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. In this connection, the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempt by any State party to use the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a tool for political purposes, which would be

in violation of the statute of the Agency. The Group reaffirms that choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

8. In this regard, while recognizing that a diverse portfolio of energy sources will be needed to allow access to sustainable energy and electricity resources in all regions of the world, and that States parties may pursue different ways to achieve their energy security and climate protection goals, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again acknowledges and reaffirms that each State party, in line with its national requirements and in accordance with its rights and obligations under the Treaty, has a sovereign right to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies, that, inter alia, includes an inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle.

9. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty takes note of the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors, through a vote, in 2010 and 2011, of three proposals of assurance of supply mechanisms within the framework of the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. In the view of the Group, the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA and any other possible regional and multilateral forums. The Group emphasizes that all technical, legal, political and economic implications and complexities surrounding this sensitive matter shall be fully taken into account. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel supply shall be made by consensus following wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations, with the participation of all IAEA member States and taking into account the interests of all its member States. Furthermore, the Group strongly emphasizes that any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all its aspects, for peaceful purposes, and if they so decide, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to its article IV.

10. In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty rejects, in principle, any attempt aimed at discouraging certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their alleged "sensitivity." The Group further underlines that concerns related to nuclear proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group expresses its concern that some States parties have set conditions such as concluding and bringing into force an additional protocol on nuclear export in contravention of article IV of the Treaty, and calls upon those States parties to promptly remove any such condition.

11. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, the Group stresses particularly the obligation of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of the developing countries to nuclear energy by fully respecting this right with

a view to achieving the widest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.

12. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the contribution that uses of nuclear energy can make to progress in general and to helping overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing States parties to the Treaty in particular. The Group firmly believes that, as a fundamental principle, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment shall be given to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty, particularly taking into account the needs of developing countries.

13. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly rejects, and calls for the immediate removal of, any restrictions or limitations posed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including restrictions on exports to other States parties of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, since such restrictions or limitations are inconsistent with the provisions and object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute.

14. In the view of the Group, transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to the facilitation of transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

15. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulates only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In the view of the Group, provisions of article IV of the Treaty are explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group is of the view that any interpretation that is used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty and, therefore, the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be ensured.

16. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the statute of IAEA. Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

17. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access by developing countries to material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, which such countries require for their continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.

18. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned about the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.

19. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet the objectives of technical cooperation for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain a balance between technical cooperation and other activities. The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources. In this regard, the efficacy of the Programme can best be achieved by ensuring that its formulation and strategies are in strict accordance with the needs and the requests of developing countries.

20. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty affirms the need to strengthen the radiological safety and protection systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials and at radioactive waste management facilities, including the safe transportation of these materials. The Group reaffirms the need to strengthen existing international regulations relating to the safety and security of transportation of such materials. While reiterating the need to take necessary measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, the Group calls for the effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the IAEA International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.

21. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States. The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards. The Group stresses that IAEA must retain centrality in this field, owing to its mandatory functions and long-standing expertise. The Group stresses that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive,

gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, and shall incorporate the views of all member States. The Group also calls for the implementation of the Nuclear Safety Action Plan endorsed by the General Conference of IAEA in September 2011.

22. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

23. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through the strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

24. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty.

25. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a threat to international peace and security and a great danger to human beings and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA. In this regard, the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group strongly urges all States to undertake unequivocally, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.

26. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations posed on developing countries which seriously hamper the exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements

with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

27. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be highly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(57)/RES/13, paragraph 27, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the Secretariat.

28. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is determined to propose, during the 2015 Review Process of the Treaty, measures required to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination are fully protected.

NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.5

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Verification

Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards "for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

2. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance and calls for strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards "shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty".

3. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

4. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.

5. In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility

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of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(57)/RES/13, paragraph 27, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and is requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and that nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty.

8. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of:

(a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

9. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

10. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.

11. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

12. In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the Review Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.

13. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

14. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.

6. While we acknowledge steps taken by the United States of America and the Russian Federation to mitigate the risk of avoidable nuclear war, including through the operation of nuclear risk reduction centres, we are concerned by the lack of declared or assumed reductions in operational status since the 2010 Review Conference.

7. The high alert nuclear force posture is based on a security environment that existed during the Cold War, but there has been no correspondingly significant change to reflect the major reduction in levels of tension since the end of the Cold War.

8. We therefore recommend that the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

(a) Urge all nuclear-weapon States to take concrete and meaningful steps, whether unilaterally, bilaterally or regionally, to implement actions 5 (e) and 5 (f) in the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference;

(b) Call on all nuclear-weapon States to provide an update to States Parties to the Treaty on efforts they have undertaken to implement actions 5 (e) and 5 (f);

(c) Highlight the importance of nuclear armed States outside the Treaty also taking steps towards de-alerting their nuclear forces.

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East

Joint working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates)

1. The political situation in the Middle East is one of the most volatile in the world. The existence of ossified problems and the lack of confidence among the countries of the region have brought about constant tensions throughout the decades.

2. There is a build-up of weapons of mass destruction in the region. Some States of the region are still not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or the Chemical Weapons Convention. Also, some States of the region have yet to agree to place their nuclear activities under full scope safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Questions remain about the nuclear capabilities of some States. There is a considerable stockpile of chemical weapons, and some States may be engaged in biological warfare-related activities.

3. To make matters worse, chemical weapons have, in fact, been used in the region, in the cases of Iraq and recently Syria, which led to humanitarian tragedies. Although the decisions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) were adopted in September 2013, and Syria became a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the commitments by the Syrian authorities with regard to the elimination of the chemical weapons stockpile and production facilities are yet to be implemented despite a strict timetable set by the decision of the Executive Council of OPCW.

4. Weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zones should be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. They constitute an important intermediate step towards the ultimate goal, namely, complete disarmament. Given the seriousness and urgency of the situation, we are of the view that the Middle East is a priority region for the establishment of such a zone.

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5. Few words can better explain the way forward than those of Queen Rania of Jordan, who said that "to achieve a lasting peace in the Middle East takes guts, not guns". Unfortunately, we note that, 40 years after the adoption of the first General Assembly resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (resolution 3263 (XXIX)), the issue remains unresolved.

6. A number of other resolutions that have the same purpose as resolution 3263 (XXIX) have been adopted by consensus by the General Assembly since 1980. A number of Security Council resolutions have also endorsed the idea. Since 1991, International Atomic Energy Agency General Conferences have also annually adopted a resolution calling for the application of full-scope safeguards on all nuclear activities in the region as a necessary step for the establishment of such a zone.

7. At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, States parties agreed on a resolution on the Middle East. The resolution states that a future weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone would commit parties not to possess, acquire, test, manufacture or use any nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as their delivery systems. The decision, adopted without a vote, to indefinitely extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 was made possible through a negotiated package of texts that included the resolution on the Middle East as well as the decisions entitled "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty" and "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)) recalled and reaffirmed the 1995 resolution.

8. At the 2010 Review Conference, States parties agreed on a decision to make progress on this issue. The United States of America, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland committed to work together with the Secretary-General to convene a regional conference to discuss the issue in 2012. Subsequently, Finnish Ambassador Jaakko Laajava was appointed as Facilitator. Regrettably, however, an international conference on a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East that would have been attended by all countries of the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at was not convened in 2012.

9. All States of the Middle East should unite around the idea of rendering the region free of all weapons of mass destruction. Transforming the Middle East into a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone will be instrumental in reducing tensions and building confidence.

10. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative firmly believes that the challenges that must be overcome to create a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East are difficult, but not insurmountable. If all countries of the region display the required political will and work in a spirit of cooperation, progress can be made.

11. We note the recent developments in the region that may improve the prospects for a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone conference. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative hopes that this positive momentum can be maintained.

12. Patience is an important virtue when it comes to the Middle East. Nevertheless, we also need to be mindful that the challenge at hand is pressing and requires a prompt solution.

13. We welcome the discussions on a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone conference that took place in Glion, Switzerland, which we supported and closely followed. We believe that these meetings are significant occasions for the countries of the region to come together and discuss the prospect of a conference on a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative hopes that the consultation process will produce substantial outcomes that will facilitate the convening of the conference.

14. The members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative see the decision to postpone the conference as a missed opportunity, not a lost one. However, we are concerned that further delay or lack of tangible progress to convene a conference could have negative repercussions for the prospects for a successful 2015 Review Conference.

15. To this end, we, as the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, recommend that:

- The international community continue to pay special attention to the ultimate goal of establishing the Middle East as a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction;
- Countries of the region work together to reach an agreement on the arrangements for the conference;
- The Conveners and the Facilitator continue their efforts in a constructive, flexible and forward-looking manner so as to ensure that the conference is convened at the earliest convenience;
- The Conveners, in consultation with the countries of the region, announce a new date for the postponed conference;
- Countries of the region continue to work constructively with the Facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, and his team;
- All interested States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty constructively assist the process to convene a conference;
- Countries of the region work to strengthen mutual understanding and cooperation.

16. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative will continue to follow this issue and stands ready to provide any support that the Conveners and the Facilitator may require.

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Addressing "Vienna issues": the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; compliance and verification; export controls; cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; nuclear safety; and nuclear security

Working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden (the Vienna Group of Ten)

1. The Vienna Group of Ten reconfirms its full commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty is the cornerstone of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime and fundamentally contributes to international peace and security. The Vienna Group of Ten places great importance on the universalization of the Treaty, and encourages all States that have not acceded to the Treaty to do so as soon as possible.

2. **This working paper on the implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty is designed to bring the so-called Vienna issues — the peaceful issues of nuclear energy, nuclear safety, security and safeguards, export controls and nuclear testing — into focus for participants at the 2014 Preparatory Committee** and aims to ensure that these issues are given appropriate weight at the 2015 Review Conference. It begins with an overview of the key issues in the order they are set out in the 2010 Review Conference outcomes document, submits a series of proposals for the Preparatory Committee's consideration, and provides more detailed analysis of the issues in annexes I to VI.

3. The Non-Proliferation Treaty plays a unique role in providing a framework that fosters international confidence and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. By aiming to ensure that nuclear materials, equipment, technology and facilities do not contribute to nuclear proliferation, the Treaty creates the necessary basis for technological transfer and cooperation.

4. Following the success of the 2010 Review Conference, progress has been made, but much work remains to be done to take its 64-point action plan forward.

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Slow progress on the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments, the lack of universality and a number of pressing non-compliance challenges have had the net effect of undermining confidence in the Treaty itself.

5. The three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty remain equally important and mutually reinforcing. The Vienna Group of Ten calls on all States, including those outside the Treaty, to redouble their efforts towards the fundamental goals of the Treaty, including full and irreversible disarmament.

6. The Vienna Group of Ten reaffirms the pivotal role of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a verifiable ban on nuclear test explosions and any other nuclear explosions. Even before the Treaty has entered into force, it has established a significant norm against testing and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization plays a valuable role in monitoring that States are not conducting nuclear tests, including through its network of monitoring stations. By building confidence, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty constitutes a core element of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and is vital to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Vienna Group of Ten strongly encourages all States yet to do so to sign and/or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay, in particular the eight remaining Annex 2 States, and to recognize the value of the Treaty for regional and international security.

7. The Vienna Group of Ten stresses that full confidence in the peaceful nature of State nuclear programmes requires all States parties to apply both a comprehensive safeguards agreement as well as an additional protocol, to submit all relevant materials and activities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, to cooperate fully with IAEA to address all safeguards issues in a timely and appropriate manner in order to validate the correctness and completeness of their declarations, and to provide early design information on all planned nuclear facilities. In order for IAEA to effectively and efficiently implement safeguards, the Vienna Group of Ten welcomes the continuing progress being made on the conceptualization of the State-level concept and encourages all member States to support this important advancement in the application of safeguards.

8. The Vienna Group of Ten underlines the responsibility that all States parties have to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Effective export controls are also central to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which depends on the existence of a climate of confidence regarding non-proliferation. The Additional Protocol is an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system and, together with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, represents the current verification standard pursuant to article III.1 of the Treaty. This verification standard should be a condition for new supply arrangements to non-nuclear-weapon States.

9. The Vienna Group of Ten notes the numerous peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including in areas such as human health, water management, agriculture, food security and nutrition, energy and environmental protection. All States parties have a right to undertake research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. IAEA plays an essential role in this regard, helping member States use nuclear techniques, where they offer an advantage over conventional methods, to address important development challenges, supporting the development of

instruments, standards and codes of conduct to minimize harmful effects, as well as by helping States parties improve their scientific, technological and regulatory capabilities.

10. The Vienna Group of Ten recognizes the right for any State to decide upon its own energy policy, but emphasizes that safety in all activities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle is a prerequisite for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and that continuous efforts are needed to prevent complacency and ensure that all elements of safety culture are maintained at the optimal level. The Group reinforces the importance of ongoing international efforts to improve the global nuclear safety regime, including adherence to and development of the necessary non-binding and legally binding instruments, and the robust implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. In this regard, the Group notes the central and ongoing role of IAEA in the sharing and applying the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station and the importance of States continuing to take active steps to fulfil the actions contained in the Plan as a matter of priority and to help identify where it can be further strengthened.

11. The Vienna Group of Ten recalls that article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is designed to detect and prevent the diversion of nuclear material, equipment and technology. This relates not only to diversion risks at the State level, but also to the risk that individuals or subnational groups gain uncontrolled access to nuclear material, equipment and technology. Physical protection and measures to combat illicit trafficking are fundamental parts of a national nuclear security regime. The existence of an effective and sustainable national nuclear security regime should be a precondition for the transfer of nuclear material, sensitive equipment and technology.

Proposals to the Preparatory Committee

12. The Vienna Group of Ten therefore proposes that the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference.

13. **On the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**, that the Review Conference:

(a) *Affirm* that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is vital to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and constitutes a core element of the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime;

(b) *Underline* that the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is of the utmost urgency as it provides the global community a permanent, non-discriminatory, and legally binding commitment to end nuclear weapon testing and all other nuclear explosions;

(c) *Urge* all States that have not yet done so to sign and/or ratify the Treaty without delay, in particular those remaining eight Annex 2 States necessary for the Treaty's entry into force;

(d) *Urge* all States to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty, pending its entry into force;

(e) *Recognize* that the continued development of the Treaty's verification regime is vital to the effectiveness of the Treaty and to maintaining the norm that existing signatures and ratifications establish against nuclear testing; and

(f) *Urge* State Signatories to support the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat to ensure that the technical aspects of the work of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization continue to move ahead so the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty at its entry into force and to sustain political progress towards entry into force.

14. **On compliance and verification**, that the Review Conference:

(a) *Underline* the importance of building and maintaining confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States;

(b) *Call* on all States to submit all relevant materials and activities, both current and future, to IAEA safeguards;

(c) *Call* for the universal application of IAEA safeguards by all States parties, and urge those States parties that have not yet done so to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement;

(d) *Recognize* the Additional Protocol as an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system, affirm that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with the Additional Protocol, represents the verification standard pursuant to article III(1) of the Treaty, and urge all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible;

(e) *Urge* all States to cooperate fully with IAEA in implementing safeguards agreements and in expeditiously addressing anomalies, inconsistencies, and questions identified by IAEA to inform annual safeguards conclusions with respect to the correctness and completeness of States' declarations;

(f) *Note* that, in order to draw well-founded safeguards conclusions, IAEA needs to receive early design information, in accordance with the 1992 decision of the IAEA Board of Governors (IAEA document GOV/2554/Attachment 2/Rev.2), and stress the need for all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to provide this information to the Agency on a timely basis; and

(g) *Welcome* the important work being undertaken by IAEA in the conceptualization of the State-level concept and the further implementation of State-level approaches to additional States parties in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system.

15. **On export controls**, that the Review Conference:

(a) *Reaffirm* that all States parties are responsible for ensuring their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty;

(b) *Urge* all States to apply in their export control regimes the Understandings of the Zangger Committee, which are designed to implement the obligations under article III of the Treaty, and make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings;

(c) *Stress* that effective export controls are central to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

(d) *Reaffirm* that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation, in accordance with article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, should be reviewed from time to time to take into account advances in technology, the proliferation sensitivity, and changes in procurement practices;

(e) *Welcome* the increasing adherence to export controls, encourage further progress in this regard, and call on all States parties to examine opportunities offered by the increasing adherence to export controls with a view to strengthening the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime;

(f) *Reaffirm* that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards, and urge all States to require an additional protocol based on the model INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) as a condition for new supply arrangements.

16. **On cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy**, that the Review Conference:

(a) *Recognize* the benefits that can be obtained from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques and acknowledge the right of all States parties to undertake research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty;

(b) *Stress* that adherence to, and compliance with, the non-proliferation and verification requirements of the Treaty is a precondition for cooperation in this field, and that the use of nuclear energy must also be accompanied by adherence to the highest levels of safety and security at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle; and

(c) *Underline* the essential role of IAEA in assisting developing States parties in engaging in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques, including through the further development of instruments, standards and codes of conduct to ensure human safety and environmental protection.

17. **On nuclear safety**, that the Review Conference:

(a) *Emphasize* the importance for States and international organizations to continue to take active steps to enhance safety measures for all fuel cycle activities;

(b) *Underline* the central role of IAEA in enhancing the global nuclear safety regime, and in sharing and encouraging the application of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station and emphasize the importance of States continuing to take active steps to fulfil the actions contained in the Nuclear Safety Action Plan as a matter of priority and to identify further scope for enhancing nuclear safety;

(c) *Emphasize* the need for States embarking on nuclear energy programmes to develop an adequate national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure to ensure safety and security for all fuel cycle activities in line with international standards, guidelines and recommendations at a very early stage of the process; and

(d) *Emphasize* the importance for all States, in particular those with nuclear fuel cycle activities, to become parties to all conventions and agreements relevant to safety and support the further development as necessary of legally binding instruments to ensure a better global safety and security framework.

18. **On nuclear security**, that the Review Conference:

(a) *Underline* the paramount importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and the need for all States to maintain the highest standards of physical protection;

(b) *Call* for the acceleration of efforts to develop and implement a fully effective global nuclear security framework based on prevention, detection and response;

(c) *Urge* States that have not yet done so to become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible;

(d) *Underline* the importance of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and urge all States to sign and ratify the Convention as soon as possible;

(e) *Note* with serious concern the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, equipment and technology;

(f) *Recognize* the increased need for all States to reinforce their efforts on improving existing control and cooperation mechanisms, including through membership of the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database;

(g) *Encourage* States concerned to further minimize highly enriched uranium stocks and to further minimize their use, including by converting radioisotope production to low-enriched uranium targets and other non-highly enriched uranium technologies, taking into account the need for an assured and reliable supply of medical isotopes; and

(h) *Welcome* other initiatives, such as the Nuclear Security Summit, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and encourage participating States to effectively follow-up their outcomes.

Annex I

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

1. The Vienna Group of Ten proposes that the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference. On the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, it is recommended that the Review Conference:

(a) *Affirm* that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is vital to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and constitutes a core element of the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime;

(b) *Underline* that the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is of the utmost urgency as it provides the global community a permanent, non-discriminatory, and legally binding commitment to end nuclear weapon testing and all other nuclear explosions;

(c) *Urge* all States that have not yet to done so to sign and/or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay, in particular those remaining eight Annex 2 States necessary for the Treaty's entry into force;

(d) *Urge* all States to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force;

(e) *Recognize* that the continued development of the Treaty's verification regime is vital to the effectiveness of the Treaty and to maintaining the norm that existing signatures and ratifications establish against nuclear testing; and

(f) *Urge* State Signatories to support the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat to ensure that the technical aspects of the work of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization continue to move ahead so the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the treaty at its entry into force and to sustain political progress towards entry into force.

2. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was an integral part of the 1995 decision to indefinitely extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Once in effect, it will provide the global community a permanent, non-discriminatory, and legally binding commitment to end nuclear weapon testing and all other nuclear explosions. It constrains the development of nuclear weapons and their qualitative improvement, which combats both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. The provisions of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be interpreted in this light.

3. Almost two decades after it was opened for signature, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has yet to enter into force. There has been progress in ratification and there are continued efforts to that end: the Treaty has now been signed by 183 States, of which 162 have ratified, including 36 whose ratification is necessary for entry into force. Recalling the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, including the 2010 action plan, entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remains of the utmost urgency.

4. Pending the Treaty's entry into force, States should refrain from any action that would defeat its object and purpose. Development of new types of nuclear weapons, for example, may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions and any

other nuclear explosions must be maintained, but such moratoriums cannot serve as a substitute for ratifying the Treaty.

5. The eighth Article XIV Conference, held in September 2013 in New York, confirmed the continuing commitment of the international community to the Treaty and highlighted the importance of its earliest possible entry into force. The Ministerial Conference on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, to be held in New York in September 2014, provides an opportunity to reaffirm strong political support for the early entry into force of the Treaty.

6. The nuclear tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2006, 2009 and 2013, which were detected by the Treaty's verification system and internationally condemned, undermine the international non-proliferation regimes and the object and purpose of the Treaty. These events further underlined the need for a universal and effective international monitoring and verification system for detecting nuclear explosions and highlight the importance of bringing the Treaty into force as soon as possible.

7. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is making progress building the system to verify compliance with the Treaty at its entry into force. The goal of this work should be an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach. All major components of the verification system, including the capability to conduct an on-site inspection, should be ready to meet the verification requirements of the Treaty by the time of its entry into force. An integrated field exercise, to be held later in 2014 in Jordan, should help develop, test and refine the procedures and tools to conduct on-site inspections, as well as provide inspectors with hands-on experience.

8. In order to enable the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission to complete its mandate, State Signatories should provide adequate resources and political support, as well as relevant expertise, and make every effort to ensure the technical aspects of its work sustain progress towards entry into force.

9. Widespread advocacy, outreach and capacity-building have the potential to support further ratifications of the Treaty. States that have recently ratified have a unique ability to engage countries yet to ratify, by sharing their experiences of ratification. The recently established Group of Eminent Persons also contributes to this process.

10. Extensive training courses in the framework of the Capacity Development Initiative as well as the Pilot Project have brought relevant experts from developing countries to technical meetings. These capacity-building activities contribute to enhanced awareness of the Treaty, help enable State Signatories to fulfil their verification responsibilities and address possible technical, scientific and legal challenges.

11. Data from the international monitoring and verification system should continue to be used for civil and scientific purposes, especially in the context of natural disasters and other emergency situations. There has recently been enhanced cooperation with other international organizations in this regard.

Annex II

Compliance and verification

1. The Vienna Group of Ten proposes that the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference. On compliance and verification, it is recommended that the Review Conference:

(a) *Underline* the importance of building and maintaining confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States;

(b) *Call* on all States to submit all relevant materials and activities, both current and future, to IAEA safeguards;

(c) *Call* for the universal application of IAEA safeguards by all States parties and urge those States parties that have not yet done so to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement;

(d) *Recognize* the Additional Protocol as an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system, affirm that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with the Additional Protocol, represents the verification standard pursuant to article III(1) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and urge all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible;

(e) *Urge* all States to cooperate fully with IAEA in implementing safeguards agreements and in expeditiously addressing anomalies, inconsistencies, and questions identified by IAEA to inform annual safeguards conclusions with respect to the correctness and completeness of States' declarations;

(f) *Note* that, in order to draw well-founded safeguards conclusions, IAEA needs to receive early design information, in accordance with the 1992 decision of the IAEA Board of Governors (IAEA document GOV/2554/Attachment 2/Rev.2), and stress the need for all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to provide this information to the Agency on a timely basis; and

(g) *Welcome* the important work being undertaken by IAEA in the conceptualization of the State-level concept and the further implementation of State-level approaches to additional States parties in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system.

2. Full compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty, including with relevant safeguards agreements and subsidiary arrangements, remains fundamentally important. The integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty depends upon full respect for the set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing obligations and rights of States parties conferred by the Treaty.

3. Article III(1) of the Treaty requires each non-nuclear-weapons State party to accept safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities. A State's comprehensive safeguards agreement, based on document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), embodies the obligation that the State account for and control all nuclear material subject to safeguards and provide the required design information and reports to IAEA. The Agency, as the competent authority designated under article III to apply safeguards, verifies the correctness and completeness of a State's declarations with a view to providing assurances of the

non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

4. While a comprehensive safeguards agreement is essential in providing measures for verifying the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, such measures alone are not sufficient for the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. It is therefore necessary for a comprehensive safeguards agreement to be complemented by an additional protocol based on document INFCIRC/540 (Corrected). The implementation of an additional protocol provides increased confidence about a State's compliance with article II of the Treaty. The Additional Protocol is an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system and, together with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, represents the current verification standard pursuant to article III.1 of the Treaty.

5. States parties which have not yet done so should conclude and implement comprehensive safeguards agreements without further delay; all States should submit all nuclear material and activities, both current and future, to IAEA safeguards; and States parties which have not yet done so should conclude and bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible and implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.

6. Annual safeguards conclusions drawn by IAEA are of critical importance to assess States' compliance with their related obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All States should cooperate fully with IAEA in implementing safeguards agreements and in expeditiously addressing anomalies, inconsistencies and questions identified by IAEA with a view to obtaining and maintaining the required conclusions. The full use of all tools at the Agency's disposal for resolution of safeguards issues, including special inspections when deemed necessary, remains important.

7. Despite the widespread implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements, 12 States have yet to fulfil their respective obligation under the Treaty. One hundred and forty-three States have signed additional protocols, and such protocols are in force for 122 States.[a] Thus, a majority of States have accepted the verification standard. The comprehensive safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol together allow for the application of integrated safeguards. States that have brought into force an additional protocol fully benefit from the increased efficiency under integrated safeguards as IAEA is able to draw a broader safeguards conclusion.

8. IAEA safeguards are fundamental to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation. The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty reaffirmed IAEA as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

[a] Current as at 31 December 2013.

9. Any State party that does not comply with its obligations under the Treaty isolates itself through its own actions from the benefits of constructive international relationships and from the benefits accruing from adherence to the Treaty, including from cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, until it enters into full compliance. The Group calls on those States that are currently non-compliant — Iran, Syria and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea — to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations.

10. In order to draw well-founded safeguards conclusions, IAEA needs to receive early design information in accordance with the IAEA Board of Governors' 1992 decision, in GOV/2554/Attachment 2/Rev. 2, to determine, whenever appropriate, the status of any nuclear facilities and to verify, on an ongoing basis, that all nuclear material in non-nuclear-weapon States is placed under safeguards. All non-nuclear-weapon States parties must provide this information to the Agency on a timely basis.

11. States should undertake early consultations with the Agency early in the design process to ensure that safeguards-relevant aspects relating to new nuclear facilities are taken into consideration in order to facilitate future safeguards implementation, from their initial planning stage through design, construction, operation and decommissioning.

12. The 1995 and 2010 Review Conferences confirmed that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.

13. The State-level concept being implemented by IAEA represents a move towards a more effective and efficient safeguards systems that adheres fully to the principles of non-discriminatory, technical, objectives-based safeguards implementation.

Addendum

Non-compliance challenges to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

a. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear weapons programme remains a serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as to peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and beyond. Resolution GC(57)/RES/14 of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at its fifty-seventh session highlighted serious concerns related to implementation of IAEA safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

b. The nuclear tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2006, 2009, and 2013 demonstrate the urgent need for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to allow for the return of IAEA inspectors and the reintroduction of IAEA safeguards. The latest nuclear test highlights the important role that the Agency needs to play in resolving the nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula.

c. Implementation of the E3/EU+3/Iran Joint Plan of Action is welcome and represents an important first step in verifying the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. The recently concluded IAEA-Iran Framework for Cooperation is also a positive step. Iran should cooperate fully with the Agency to address all past outstanding issues regarding its nuclear programme. The establishment of confidence in Iran's nuclear programme requires not only assurances of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but equally importantly, of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This can only be accomplished through Iran's full and transparent cooperation with IAEA.

d. In this context, serious concerns remain regarding Iran's nuclear programme, including the 2005 finding of the Board of Governors of Iran's non-compliance with its Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement, numerous subsequent resolutions of the Board of Governors, and the "possible military dimensions" of Iran's nuclear programme found in the annex to the Director General's November 2011 report.

e. The finding by the IAEA Board of Governors (resolution GOV/2011/36 of June 2011) that, based on the report of the Director General, the destroyed building at Dair Alzour was very likely a nuclear reactor and should have been declared by Syria, remains of concern. Failure to provide design information for the facility in accordance with Code 3.1 of Syria's subsidiary arrangements remain breaches of articles 41 and 42 of Syria's Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement, and constitute non-compliance with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the Agency in the context of article XII.C of the Agency's statute. Syria must remedy its non-compliance as soon as possible in order to verify the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

Annex III

Export controls

1. The Vienna Group of Ten proposes that the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference. On export controls, it is recommended that the Review Conference:

(a) *Reaffirm* that all States parties are responsible for ensuring that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(b) *Urge* all States to apply in their export control regimes the understandings of the Zangger Committee, which are designed to implement the obligations under article III of the Treaty, and make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings;

(c) *Stress* that effective export controls are central to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

(d) *Reaffirm* that the list of items triggering International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and the procedures for implementation, in accordance with article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, should be reviewed from time to time to take into account advances in technology, the proliferation sensitivity, and changes in procurement practices;

(e) *Welcome* the increasing adherence to export controls, encourage further progress in this regard and call on all States parties to examine opportunities offered by the increasing adherence to export controls with a view to strengthening the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime;

(f) *Reaffirm* that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards, and urge all States to require an additional protocol based on the model INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) as a condition for new supply arrangements.

2. Export controls aim to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field, under article IV of the Treaty, is not hindered unduly in the process. Nuclear export controls are a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing the obligations of States parties under article III of the Treaty, in order not to contribute to a nuclear explosive activity, an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity, or acts of nuclear terrorism.

3. The existence of extensive covert networks related to the procurement and the supply of sensitive nuclear equipment and technology underline the need for all States to exercise vigilance in countering proliferation, including through their nuclear export controls.

4. There is a clear relationship between the non-proliferation obligations as set out in articles I, II and III and the objectives with regard to peaceful uses as set out in article IV of the Treaty. Nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to undertake research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Recipient States have an obligation to exercise appropriately stringent controls to prevent proliferation.

5. A number of States parties meet regularly in an informal group known as the Zangger Committee, in order to coordinate their implementation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, related to the supply of nuclear material and equipment. To this end, these States parties have adopted certain understandings, including a list of items triggering IAEA safeguards, for their exports to States not parties to the Treaty, as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/209, as amended. The Committee's understandings also relate to exports to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty insofar as the recipient State should recognize the items on the trigger list, as well as the procedures and criteria under article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty as a basis for its own export control decisions, including re-exports. The Committee provides important guidance to State parties in meeting their obligation under article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty.

6. A number of States parties have informed IAEA that they cooperate on a voluntary basis through guidelines for their nuclear-related exports (INFCIRC/254, as amended). The Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines play an important and useful role in the development of national export control policies and contribute to the international non-proliferation regime.

7. The list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation, in accordance with article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, should be reviewed from time to time so as to take into account advances in technology, proliferation sensitivity, and changes in procurement practices. In this context, the completion of the fundamental review of the control lists by the Nuclear Suppliers Group is a welcome development.

8. In September 2008, a number of States parties, participating in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, granted an India-specific exception to the full-scope safeguards requirement in the Nuclear Suppliers Group's export control guidelines, based on certain non-proliferation commitments and actions of India (IAEA document INFCIRC/734). India must continue to honour these commitments in full, noting that Governments participating in the Nuclear Suppliers Group have agreed to consult through regular channels on matters connected with the implementation of all aspects of the decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

9. Guidelines from export control regimes are finding increasing acceptance and application by national authorities and the number of States participating in these regimes continues to grow. All States parties should consider the opportunities offered by the increasing adherence to export controls with a view to strengthening the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

10. Notwithstanding the 2008 decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the principle that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to non-nuclear-weapon

States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices remains important. Those supplier States that have not yet done so should require the fulfilment of such conditions without delay.

11. Since all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have a legal obligation under article III to accept safeguards stipulated under the Treaty, and a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, represents the current verification standard for Treaty safeguards, this verification standard should be a condition for new supply arrangements to non-nuclear-weapon States. The Additional Protocol contains important provisions related to reporting to IAEA on the export and import of nuclear-related equipment.

12. Article III of the Treaty is designed to detect and prevent the diversion of nuclear material, equipment and technology. This relates to diversion not only at the State level, but also to individuals or subnational groups. Transfers of nuclear material, sensitive equipment or technology should take place only if the recipient State has in place an effective and adequate national regime of nuclear security. This regime comprises Treaty-related IAEA safeguards, an adequate system of physical protection, a minimum set of measures to combat illicit trafficking, and rules and regulations for appropriate export controls in case of re-transfers.

13. While the responsibility for establishing and implementing such a regime rests with the concerned State, supplying States parties have the responsibility to seek assurance that such a regime is in place in the recipient State as a necessary precondition for their receiving nuclear supplies.

Annex IV

Cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

1. The Vienna Group of Ten proposes the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference. On cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it is recommended that the Review Group:

(a) *Recognize* the benefits that can be obtained from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques and acknowledge the right of all States parties to undertake research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(b) *Stress* that adherence to, and compliance with, the non-proliferation and verification requirements of the Treaty is a preconditions for cooperation in this field, and that the use of nuclear energy must also be accompanied by adherence to the highest levels of safety and security at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle; and

(c) *Underline* the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in assisting developing States parties in engaging in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques, including through the further development of instruments, standards and codes of conduct to ensure human safety and environmental protection.

2. For the purposes of article IV of the Treaty, "nuclear energy" embraces both power and non-power applications. All States parties to the Treaty have an inalienable right to undertake research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. States parties may choose individually not to exercise all their rights, or to exercise those rights collectively.

3. All States parties to the Treaty have undertaken to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a safe and secure environment.

4. Nuclear applications play an essential role in areas such as human health, water management, agriculture, food safety and nutrition, energy and environmental protection. Nuclear applications make a considerable contribution to advancing the Millennium Development Goals and the IAEA technical cooperation programme plays an important role in this regard. The IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative is a flexible and efficient instrument that provides additional, extrabudgetary contributions to this programme.

5. IAEA plays an essential role assisting States party in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the development of programmes aimed at improving their scientific, technological and regulatory capabilities. The Vienna Group welcomes the Agency's efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of these programmes. Close cooperation with other States parties and international organizations, notably of the United Nations system, facilitates synergies and minimizes overlap.

6. The IAEA medium-term strategy is important for technical cooperation through model project standards and expanded use of country programme

commitment as a prerequisite for such cooperation. IAEA should continue taking this objective, and the needs of developing countries, notably least developed countries, and the Millennium Development Goals into account when planning its future activities.

7. When developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, it remains important to ensure that the use of nuclear energy is accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as the highest levels of safety and security at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Instruments, standards and codes of conduct developed within the framework of IAEA to prevent and/or mitigate harmful effects on human safety and the environment are of great importance in this regard. When developing nuclear energy, it remains important to ensure that the technical and regulatory infrastructure, a skilled workforce, as well as a legislative framework and regulatory bodies, are in place.

Annex V

Nuclear safety

1. The Vienna Group of Ten proposes that the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference. On nuclear safety, it is recommended that Review Conference:

(a) *Emphasize* the importance for States and international organizations to continue to take active steps to enhance safety measures for all fuel cycle activities;

(b) *Underline* the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in enhancing the global nuclear safety regime, and in sharing and encouraging the application of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station and emphasize the importance of States continuing to take active steps to fulfil the actions contained in the Nuclear Security Action Plan as a matter of priority and to identify further scope for enhancing nuclear safety;

(c) *Emphasize* the need for States embarking on nuclear energy programmes to develop an adequate national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure to ensure safety and security for all fuel cycle activities in line with international standards, guidelines and recommendations at a very early stage of the process; and

(d) *Emphasize* the importance for all States, in particular those with nuclear fuel cycle activities, to become parties to all conventions and agreements relevant to safety and support the further development as necessary of legally binding instruments to ensure a better global safety and security framework.

2. Safety in all activities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle is a prerequisite for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Continuous efforts are needed to prevent complacency and ensure that all elements of safety culture are maintained at the optimal level. Although primary responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations rests with individual States, international cooperation is vital for the exchange of knowledge and learning from best practices.

3. IAEA activities directed towards strengthening nuclear safety are crucial, including in operating power and research reactors and recognizing that ongoing challenges for safety include the ageing of facilities.

4. The international community strengthened its focus on nuclear safety following the 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan and the subsequent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, including through the Declaration adopted by the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in June 2011, the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security hosted by the Secretary-General in September 2011 and the subsequent Nuclear Safety Action Plan endorsed by the IAEA General Conference in 2011.

5. The strength of the Action Plan will be in its robust implementation, including prioritization, as new lessons are learned and weaknesses are identified. IAEA has a central role to play in implementation of the Plan, including through its ongoing initiatives, including international expert meetings, safety assessments and peer review service missions. All States with nuclear facilities should host IAEA review missions on a regular basis, as provided for in the Plan. Further steps to increase States' commitment to these missions, for example by agreeing on a mandatory periodicity of peer reviews, would be welcome.

6. Nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies, and acts with malicious intent associated with nuclear and radiological terrorism, may lead to significant radiological consequences over wide geographical areas, generate a pressing need for authoritative information to address public and media concerns, and require an effective international response.

7. The IAEA Safety Standards Commission and Committees continues to prepare internationally recognized safety fundamentals, requirements and guides. The IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles continue to provide a unified conceptual basis for the ongoing development of safety standards.

8. Adequate and independent national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure is of crucial importance, and challenges remain with regard to the availability of well-trained staff. Therefore sustainable programmes for education and training are of fundamental importance, and technical cooperation and assistance play an important role in developing national infrastructure.

9. The Convention on Nuclear Safety remains of central importance and States operating, constructing or planning nuclear power reactors, or considering a nuclear power programme, should become a party. The voluntary application of the relevant provisions of the Convention to other nuclear installations dedicated to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is important. The Sixth Review Meeting of the Parties to the Convention, to be held in 2014, provides a timely opportunity to consider its operation. The working group on "effectiveness and transparency" has provided useful input.

10. The IAEA secretariat's implementation of the Plan of Activities on the Radiation Protection of the Environment remains important. There should be further cooperation between IAEA and relevant international organizations and stakeholders in promoting a coherent international policy regarding the radiological protection of the environment.

11. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) continues to provide a valuable contribution by assessing and reporting levels and effects of exposure to ionizing radiation, including its full assessment on the consequences to humans and the environment as a result of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station. Many States parties rely on estimates from UNSCEAR as the scientific basis for evaluating radiation risk and for establishing protective measures.

12. The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources remains important, as does the comprehensive Action Plan for its implementation subsequently adopted by the Board. The Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources also remains important, as demonstrated by the IAEA General Conference's encouragement for States to act in accordance with the Guidance on a harmonized basis. All States parties should make political commitments to the Code and the Guidance and subsequently implement them.

13. All States parties should become parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and should actively step up efforts to develop and implement disposal and long-term storage solutions for spent fuel and radioactive waste. IAEA continues to conduct valuable efforts in waste management.

14. Remediating the various nuclear legacy challenges remains important, as recognized by the establishment of an international working forum for the regulatory supervision of legacy contaminated sites. The Agency should continue facilitating ongoing international efforts in this regard.

15. All States that have not yet done so should take the steps necessary to become parties to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The Seventh Meeting of the Representatives of Competent Authorities identified under the joint conventions are due to be held in Vienna in 2014. There remains a need to strengthen the implementation of the conventions and work for amending their review mechanisms, where appropriate.

16. The recommendations and conclusions of the IAEA Action Plan for Strengthening the International Preparedness and Response System for Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies provide valuable guidance. This should be supported by continued efforts by the IAEA secretariat and member States to implement the strategy outlined in the final report of that Plan, particularly in the light of the nuclear accident at Fukushima. The IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre serves as the Agency's focal point for responding to nuclear or radiological incidents and emergencies and for promoting improvement in emergency response and preparedness.

17. International cooperation to enhance the safety of international navigation, while respecting maritime and air navigation rights and freedoms, as provided for in international law and as reflected in relevant international instruments, remains important. It is in the interests of all States that maritime and other transportation of radioactive materials be conducted in compliance with international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and that States have under international law the obligation to protect and preserve the maritime environment.

18. Concerns about a potential accident or incident during the transport of radioactive materials remain. The practice of some shipping States and operators of providing, in a timely manner, information and responses to relevant coastal States in advance of shipments of radioactive materials for the purpose of addressing concerns regarding safety and security, including emergency preparedness, is positive. Recent advances in cooperation in relation to the importance of transparency and timely information exchange between Governments in the event of an accident during the transport of nuclear material and the adoption of best practice guidelines for systematic communications to build on the current practice of voluntary exchange of information provide practical examples.

19. All States should ensure that national regulatory documents conform with the current edition of the Agency's transport regulations. Coordination with other bodies associated with the transport of dangerous goods, including the Economic and Social Council Committee of Experts, the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization, remain important.

20. In the light of the various conventions on civil liability for nuclear damage, having effective liability mechanisms in place to ensure prompt compensation for damage to people, property and the environment, as well as actual economic loss, owing to an accident or incident during the transport of radioactive materials is important.

21. The IAEA International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability continues to undertake valuable work examining the application and scope of the Agency's nuclear liability regime and considering and identification of further specific actions to address any gaps in scope and coverage of the regime. The International Expert Group should continue to address outstanding issues as provided for in the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and in the recommendations of the 2011 IAEA International Conference on the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Materials.

Annex VI

Nuclear security

1. The Vienna Group of Ten proposes that the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference. On nuclear security, it is recommended that the Review Conference:

(a) *Underline* the paramount importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and the need for all States to maintain the highest standards of physical protection;

(b) *Call* for the acceleration of efforts to develop and implement a fully effective global nuclear security framework based on prevention, detection and response;

(c) *Urge* States that have not yet done so to become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible;

(d) *Underline* the importance of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and urge all States to sign and ratify the Convention as soon as possible;

(e) *Note* with serious concern the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, equipment and technology;

(f) *Recognize* the increased need for all States to reinforce their efforts on improving existing control and cooperation mechanisms, including through membership of the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database;

(g) *Encourage* States concerned to further minimize highly enriched uranium stocks and to further minimize their use, including by converting radioisotope production to low-enriched uranium targets and other non-highly enriched uranium technologies, taking into account the need for an assured and reliable supply of medical isotopes; and

(h) *Welcome* other initiatives, such as the Nuclear Security Summit, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and encourages participating states to effectively follow-up their outcomes.

2. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a central and essential role in the efforts to improve global nuclear security framework, promote its implementation and facilitate effective cooperation and coordination at the international and regional levels. In this regard, it is of great importance that the Agency continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to carry out its mandated nuclear security activities.

3. IAEA and the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee have made progress in developing the Nuclear Security Series, comprising a comprehensive set of Nuclear Security Fundamentals, Recommendations, Implementing Guides and Technical Guidance publications. It is crucial also that cyber- and information security will be handled by the Committee.

4. IAEA is also making an important contribution in assisting States in meeting appropriate security standards. All States should take full advantage of the IAEA advisory services in that regard, including the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service and the establishment of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans.

5. The Ministerial Declaration adopted by consensus by all member States of IAEA at the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts convened by the Agency in Vienna in 2013 is an important milestone in strengthening nuclear security worldwide.

6. Continued and enhanced efforts are needed to provide for the full and effective protection of nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport. It is therefore of great importance that all States parties act in accordance with the object and purpose of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material until such time as it enters into force.

7. The minimization of the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications, including the conversion of civilian research reactors to low-enriched uranium fuel, carries non-proliferation and security benefits. States concerned should further minimize highly enriched uranium stocks and use and convert radioisotope production to low-enriched uranium targets and other non-highly enriched uranium technologies, where technically and economically feasible, and taking into account the need for an assured supply of medical isotopes.

8. The illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, equipment and technology remains a serious concern. All States must fully cooperate in identifying the supply routes and sources of the aforesaid. All States should reinforce their efforts on improving existing control and cooperation mechanisms as appropriate in order to achieve higher degrees of effectiveness in the efforts to curb illicit trafficking.

9. IAEA continues to undertake activities to provide for the enhanced exchange of information, including through the continued maintenance of its Incident and Trafficking Database. All States should consider joining and participating actively in this programme. There remains a need for enhanced coordination among States and among international organizations, such as work by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the World Customs Organization, in preventing, detecting and responding to the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.

10. Nuclear forensics is important in determining the origin of detected nuclear and other radioactive materials, and in providing evidence for the prosecution of acts of illicit trafficking and malicious uses. States should develop and enhance nuclear forensics capabilities and engage in enhanced international cooperation in this regard. IAEA, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group deliver important contributions to further enhance knowledge and capabilities in this field.

11. In the conviction that States and industry have a common interest in fostering nuclear security, a substantial contribution of nuclear industry in evaluating nuclear security regulations is essential. While strengthening this cooperation, possible divergences of interest and the ultimate responsibility of national authorities should duly be taken into consideration.

12. Fostering nuclear security culture through nuclear security education, training and proper certification of nuclear security managers should be a priority for States and nuclear industry. The establishment of centres of excellence and other nuclear security training and support centres, as well as an international nuclear security education network, has been positive. In this regard, close cooperation with and through IAEA is essential.

13. A number of valuable initiatives exist to support the goals of nuclear security, including: the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, with its continued multilateral and bilateral contributions to enhance the physical protection of nuclear facilities and weapons-usable material worldwide; the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which is contributing to the reduction and protection of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which aims at developing partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism consistent with the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Proliferation Security Initiative, which further enhances international cooperation in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material.

14. The effective implementation of the workplan adopted by the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., in 2010, should continue to be supported. Participating States should effectively follow up the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in The Hague in 2014, in order to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism and to make the global nuclear security architecture as strong and comprehensive as possible. All States are encouraged to consider participating in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, including the next Plenary to be held in Helsinki in June 2015.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Nuclear disarmament post-New START

Working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates)

1. The Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms the "unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI".

2. Action 5 of the action plan spells out that the nuclear-weapon States "commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference".

3. The present paper will focus on the fulfilment of action 4 of the 2010 action plan, which calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty). This call needs to be framed within the broader objectives set by action 3, which stipulates the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral regional and multilateral measures. Other issues on nuclear disarmament have been dealt with in various working papers by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, such as a fissile material cut-off treaty (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.10), the transparency of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12), disarmament and non-proliferation education (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.14), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.1), non-strategic nuclear weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.3) and the reduced role of nuclear weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.4).

4. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative welcomes the unilateral measures undertaken in the past few years. We would welcome more activities in this regard. We note that, so far, the onus has been on bilateral dealings between the Russian Federation and the United States of America to work on bilateral nuclear

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disarmament efforts. According to the Final Document of the Review Conference of 2010, a special responsibility lies with the States possessing the largest arsenals.

5. The Final Document also encourages the Russian Federation and the United States of America to "continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals." This emphasizes the fundamental conviction underpinning the action plan that nuclear disarmament is an ongoing endeavour which demands continuous progress. The 1995 decision on disarmament and non-proliferation states that with the end of the cold war and the ensuing easing of tensions, cooperation based on trust replaced the former antagonism.

6. The United States of America and the Russian Federation significantly reduced their nuclear arsenals after the end of the cold war. The successful completion of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, in December 2013, is also a very welcome development. 500 tons of Russian highly enriched uranium stockpiles (enough to fuel 20,000 nuclear weapons) have been converted into low-enriched uranium suitable for use as power reactor fuel. Efforts made first under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), and subsequently under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), are now being taken forward under the more comprehensive New START Treaty. With the full implementation of New START by 2018, the nuclear arsenals of the United States of America and the Russian Federation will return to the levels in existence before the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

7. In the light of this assessment, the obligations and commitments made at the Review Conferences since 1995, and in the spirit of the action plan, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative welcomes the offer made by the President of the United States of America, Barack Obama, on 19 June 2013 in Berlin to seek negotiated cuts with the Russian Federation and to further reduce deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one third. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative expects that this offer provides a much needed perspective for the next round of nuclear weapons reductions in line with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We hope that it will lead to progress in bilateral negotiations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on a comprehensive reduction of nuclear weapons including non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons, as the action plan of 2010 requires action with respect to all types of nuclear weapons.

8. While recognizing the positive impact of this trend in bilateral reductions, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative recalls that this does not replace multilateral negotiations towards the ultimate elimination of all types of nuclear weapons regardless of their size and location, in accordance with article VI. Action 3 also recommends regional or multilateral measures, which have so far not materialized. In this context, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative expects that the ongoing dialogue among the nuclear-weapon States will lead to concrete and tangible results at the third session of the Preparatory Committee. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative looks forward to an intensification of this process, which must be a departure point or platform for future multilateral disarmament negotiations, particularly after the next bilateral United States-Russian disarmament round has been achieved.

9. The action plan stipulates that all nuclear-weapon States, not only the two States with the largest arsenals, should reduce all types of nuclear weapons in their stockpiles, deployed and non-deployed. Any build-up of nuclear arsenals runs counter to the obligations of nuclear weapon-States. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative remains deepiy concerned about the reported build-up of nuclear arsenals by some States, against the clear intent of the international community to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In this context, we urge all nuclear-weapon States to continue, and in some cases, to start reducing their arsenals, with the objective of their total elimination.

10. Apart from this obligation, the action plan commits all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from developing or qualitatively improving nuclear weapons. They are called upon to end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.

On this basis, the 2015 Review Conference should:

11. Welcome the ongoing implementation of New START and urge the United States of America and the Russian Federation to engage in a new round of negotiations and advance further steps in line with the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency.

12. Reiterate that the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament concerns not only the two States with the largest arsenals and that, in due time, the other nuclear-weapon States should also take part in nuclear disarmament negotiations, bearing in mind that all States parties are called upon to engage in multilateral disarmament negotiations under the provisions of article VI. Pending such negotiations, nuclear-weapon States must undertake not to increase their nuclear holdings.

13. Call upon all nuclear-weapon States and other States possessing nuclear weapons to take further steps to reduce their arsenals, regardless of their size, type or location, and to declare a moratorium on developing new warheads and new types of nuclear weapons, and on upgrading existing nuclear weapons or developing new missions for nuclear weapons. A further build-up of nuclear arsenals runs counter to the obligations under the action plan and article VI.

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Increased transparency in nuclear disarmament

Working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates)

1. As recognized in the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as in the action plan agreed upon at the 2010 Review Conference, increased transparency is an important precondition for further progress in nuclear disarmament.

2. As a part of its efforts to promote the implementation of the 2010 action plan, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submitted to the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference a working paper entitled "Transparency of Nuclear Weapons: the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative". The working paper contained a draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form with specific items on which the nuclear-weapon States could provide information, including the quantity, types and status of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems, the quantity of fissile material produced for military purposes in the past as well as presently, and the measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. The aim of this proposal was to provide the nuclear-weapon States with a template with which to implement action 21.

3. Noting the call in action 5 for the nuclear-weapon States to report on their nuclear disarmament undertakings at the 2014 Preparatory Committee meetings, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative is submitting the present working paper to make four specific recommendations on this important subject.

Three principles of nuclear disarmament

4. Action 2 of the 2010 action plan acknowledged the three principles of nuclear disarmament, namely, irreversibility, verifiability and transparency. The principle of transparency underpins the other two principles. Without transparency, nuclear

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disarmament cannot be verified, nor would States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have complete confidence that nuclear disarmament measures have been accomplished in an irreversible manner.

Reporting and transparency

5. Reporting is a practical and effective tool to achieve greater transparency. Reporting has been a method for strengthening accountability since the Preparatory Committee for the 1985 Review Conference first invited the nuclear-weapon States to "provide information relevant to the implementation of various articles of the Treaty, including especially article VI", as mentioned in the Final Document of the 1985 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.III/64/I). A number of transparency efforts exist in other forums, for example, the 1998 IAEA Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549).

6. "Information" provided by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, where the issue of the extension of the Treaty was discussed and agreed upon, was quite significant in terms of its scope and contents. However, after the 1995 Conference, even though "regular reporting" on the implementation of article VI was included as one of the 13 practical steps at the 2000 Review Conference, the actual reporting by the nuclear-weapon States has been sporadic and informal. Against this backdrop, the 2010 Review Conference agreed upon the need for a standard reporting form.

7. The 2010 action plan refers to reporting on three occasions. However, the relationship between the three references requires further clarification.

Strengthening the review process and transparency

8. Strengthening the review process was first agreed upon at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as an integral part of the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The essential significance of this issue was that it ensured, among other things, accountability, in particular of nuclear-weapon States, in exchange for indefinitely extending the Treaty.

9. Reporting is an effective instrument both for providing greater transparency on nuclear disarmament activities and for greater accountability as a part of the strengthened review process. Indeed, "regular reports" were agreed upon at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences "within the framework of the strengthened review process", which demonstrates the relationship between reporting and strengthening the review process.

10. Action 20 calls for "regular reports" not just by the nuclear-weapon States, but by all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and not just on nuclear disarmament, but on all three pillars of the Treaty. However, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative re-emphasizes the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to report on their nuclear disarmament activities and the fulfilment of their obligations and commitments under the Treaty.

11. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative recommends that the 2015 Review Conference:

(a) In relation to three principles of nuclear disarmament, reiterate the importance of the realization of nuclear disarmament measures under strict

observance of the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility. The 2015 Review Conference should also recognize that the principle of transparency underpins the principles of verification and irreversibility;

(b) In relation to reporting, call on the nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form, as recommended under action 21 of the action plan of 2010, and to utilize the form in implementing action 20 (regular reports) and action 5 (reporting on nuclear disarmament efforts at the 2014 Preparatory Committee);

(c) In relation to strengthening the review process, highlight the relationship between increased transparency through regular reporting utilizing a standard reporting form and the objective of accountability that is at the core of strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process. In this context of a strengthened review process, the 2015 Review Conference should urge the nuclear-weapon States to make regular reports, as an important confidence-building measure, for instance, annually, on their nuclear disarmament activities, utilizing a standard reporting form, and to continuously work to improve the quantity and quality of information provided in the agreed standard form during the 2020 review cycle;

(d) Call upon all States parties, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, to submit regular reports on their fulfilment of their obligations and commitments under the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Nuclear disarmament

Working paper submitted by Iraq on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States

1. The Arab States believe that, instead of bringing about regional and international peace and security, the possession, acquisition and development of nuclear weapons will increase instability. They affirm that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the only way to avoid the dangers such weapons pose and ensure that they are not used again.

2. The Arab States affirm that the credibility of the Treaty depends on the balanced functioning of its three pillars of disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and on working to implement those pillars with an equal focus, while striving at the same time to achieve the universality of the Treaty.

3. Although many States have made efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and ensure that nuclear-weapon States fulfil their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear-weapon States continue to give nuclear weapons a prominent place in their defence strategies and they confer upon themselves the right to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. This is contrary to the unilateral declarations that the nuclear-weapon States made in April 1995 regarding positive and negative assurances to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995).

4. The Arab States are concerned at the continued stagnation of the United Nations disarmament mechanisms, in particular the Conference on Disarmament, which is the sole international forum for multilateral negotiations on disarmament, and call for practical steps to be taken to revitalize those mechanisms.

5. The Arab States affirm that the aims and objectives of the Treaty can be realized only once accession thereto is universal, with all States not parties to the Treaty acceding as non-nuclear-weapon States. The delay in achieving that objective remains a stumbling block to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

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6. The Arab States recall the advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice on 8 July 1996 concerning the legality of the threat of use of nuclear weapons in which the Court found that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith, and bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

7. The Arab States reiterate that, as affirmed at the 2010 Review Conference, the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which was adopted by consensus and is basis for the indefinite extension of the Treaty, shall remain valid until its goals are achieved.

8. The Arab States recall that the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference provides for the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament".

9. The Arab States welcome the efforts made towards the voluntary reduction of the number of nuclear warheads. At the same time, they emphasize that a reduction in the number of nuclear warheads should not be confused with nuclear disarmament efforts; a reduction does not necessarily entail progress towards nuclear disarmament.

10. The Arab States are concerned that certain nuclear States are endeavouring to modernize their nuclear arsenal and develop new nuclear weapons, thereby endangering international peace and security. The letter and the spirit of the Treaty must be respected until such weapons are comprehensively and definitively eliminated. In that regard, the Arab States draw attention to the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

11. The Arab States affirm what was set out in resolutions 23/40-POL, on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; 24/40-POL, on evolving a new global consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation; 28/40-POL, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; 29/40-POL, on condemnation of the Zionist regime for possession of nuclear capability to develop nuclear arsenals; and 30/40-POL, on total elimination of nuclear weapons, adopted by the Council of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation at its 40th session held in Conakry, Republic of Guinea, from 9 to 11 December 2013.

12. The Arab States stress that the international conference that was to be convened in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with the practical steps concerning the Middle East set forth in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, would constitute an important step towards realizing regional and international security, contributing to the prevention of nuclear war and bolstering the non-proliferation regime.

13. The Arab States affirm the importance of convening the postponed conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction at the earliest possible opportunity, which must be in 2014. Responsibility for the convening of the conference lies with the whole international community, and if it is not held in due course, that must be considered as a violation of the review process and the related obligations. In that context, there is a direct link between the convening of the conference in 2014 and its realization

of perceptible success through the initiation of a negotiation process within a specific time frame to achieve that zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and the success of the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee. In that regard, the Arab States recall the detailed position contained in the working paper on the Middle East that was submitted to the third session of the Preparatory Committee.

14. The Arab States welcome General Assembly resolution 68/32, entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament", adopted on 5 December 2013. They also welcome the great interest generated by the meeting that was held on 26 September 2013 and recognize its contribution to furthering the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

15. The Arab States underline the importance of the Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Nayarit, Mexico, on 13 and 14 February 2014, which heard that no party has the capacity to address the aftermath of deliberate or accidental nuclear explosions. The Arab States welcome the offer of Austria to host the next meeting on that topic. The Arab States affirm that the possession, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

Recommendations

16. The Arab States therefore propose that the 2015 Review Conference should consider the following recommendations:

(a) It should be reaffirmed that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, and action should be taken to ensure its universality and full application;

(b) Nuclear-weapon States should be encouraged to take genuine measures in order to complete rapidly the implementation of the agreed practical steps contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, some of which were reaffirmed as action 5 in the section on disarmament of nuclear weapons in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference;

(c) Support for the early convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be emphasized;

(d) The nuclear-weapon States should declare that they have ceased modernizing their nuclear arsenals or developing new types of nuclear weapons, until such time as their elimination in a transparent manner may be verified;

(e) The States parties and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, should make greater efforts to ensure the universality of the Treaty. Such efforts should include the performance of their undertakings under the Treaty and the outcomes of the Review Conferences, including the imposition of a comprehensive ban on the transfer of all nuclear materials and related technology to States non-parties to the Treaty until such time as they accede thereto. Any attempt to give the stamp of legitimacy to the nuclear status of States non-parties to the Treaty should be decisively rejected, given that it would hasten the complete breakdown of the non-proliferation regime;

(f) The importance of universalizing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and facilitating its entry into force should be reaffirmed. States that have yet

to ratify that Treaty should be encouraged to do so, particularly nuclear-weapon States, which bear fundamental responsibility in that regard;

(g) The Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should be urged to devise, in accordance with the request of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that will include the commencement of negotiations concerning:

- A comprehensive treaty that would prohibit the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transport and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and provide for their destruction. The Treaty would provide for nuclear disarmament through the gradual eradication of nuclear weapons, within a specified time frame, resulting in their complete, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination;
- A ban on the use and future production of fissile materials for military purposes that also addresses the stockpiling of those materials by nuclear-weapon States, with a view to ensuring that non-proliferation issues do not overshadow efforts to promote disarmament;
- International arrangements to provide non-nuclear-weapon States parties with unconditional and legally enforceable security assurances that they will not be subject to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them by the five nuclear Powers, until such time as nuclear weapons have been completely eliminated.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Working paper submitted by Iraq on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States

I. Background

1. At the eighteenth session of the Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit level, that was held in Khartoum in 2006, the Arab States announced action at both the national and regional levels to develop programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with a view to achieving development in various spheres. At its nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first sessions, held in Riyadh in March 2007, Damascus in March 2008 and Doha in March 2009, respectively, the Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit level discussed that issue, and adopted the following important resolutions:

(a) Resolutions Nos. 383, 425 and 471, entitled Development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the States members of the League of Arab States, which determined that Arab States would, at the national level, focus on training staff and establishing the scientific and research bases for the development of nuclear energy;

(b) Resolutions Nos. 384, 426 and 472, entitled Development of joint Arab programmes for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which called for Arab regional cooperation in carrying out joint projects in order to underpin development in those fields.

2. At successive sessions, the Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit level adopted resolutions that affirmed the inalienable right of the Arab States to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as provided for in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In that connection, the Arab States reject attempts to restrict or limit that right while privileges are granted to certain States not parties to the Treaty.

3. Resolution No. 472, which was adopted in Doha on 30 March 2009 at the twenty-first session of the Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit level, endorsed the Arab strategy for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to 2020, which was drafted by the Arab Atomic Energy Agency in 2008.

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II. The position of the Arab States

4. The Arab States affirm that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are a fundamental right of the parties to the Treaty, and that any reinterpretation of that right is prohibited by article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, which provides: Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

5. The Arab States consider that any breach of article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, would be inconsistent with one of the principles that prompted the non-nuclear States to become parties to the Treaty, namely, that the right to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was unrestricted and non-discriminatory; and affirm that all States parties are entitled to obtain the international support necessary to develop their capacities in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

6. The Arab States affirm the importance of the principle that every country has the right to express its choices and take its own decisions with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without prejudice to its policies, the agreements and arrangements that it has concluded under international cooperation programmes in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or its policy with respect to the nuclear fuel cycle.

7. The Arab States believe that strengthening the rights of States parties to the Treaty in those fields will underpin and reinforce the Treaty, particularly in view of the fact that those States are committed to the safeguards agreements concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is the sole international body authorized to verify whether or not a State is in compliance with its safeguards agreements.

8. While persistent attempts are being made to restrict the right of States parties to the Treaty to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the States that possess nuclear materials and technology are cooperating with non-States parties to the Treaty, thereby demonstrating the double standards that are used with regard to Decision 2, paragraph 12, of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament that was adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

9. The Arab States are therefore concerned that a non-party State has again been exempted from the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers issued by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which prohibit nuclear transfers to non-party States whose nuclear facilities are not subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards regimes. Such transfers contravene article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and damage its credibility.

10. Although many Arab States have voluntarily signed additional protocols, they all reject attempts to make such additional protocols a necessary rather than a voluntary condition for the acquisition of peaceful nuclear technologies and the exchange of information to promote their development, when States outside the nuclear non-proliferation regime have been exempted from that condition and have not been pressed to accede to the Treaty.

11. On the basis of those considerations, the Arab States propose that the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty should consider the following recommendations:

(a) It should be emphasized that under article IV of the Treaty, all States parties have a fundamental and inalienable right to benefit from nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and any restrictions to that fundamental right should be rejected;

(b) It should be affirmed that any reinterpretation of an article of the Treaty in such a manner as to hamper or infringe that fundamental right would constitute a clear violation of the Treaty and undermine its credibility and purpose; any attempt to make the voluntary conclusion of additional protocols into a precondition for the acquisition by developing States of peaceful nuclear technologies should be rejected;

(c) Respect for States' national decisions to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be emphasized; no steps should be taken that could hamper or negatively affect international cooperation on peaceful technologies with those States, so long as they remain committed to the safeguards agreements concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(d) It should be affirmed that the Agency is the authority with sole responsibility for verifying State compliance with commitments under the Treaty;

(e) Every State party to the Treaty should facilitate the exchange of scientific and technological materials and information in as complete a manner as possible in the context of the Treaty, so long as the State obtaining those materials or information is committed to the safeguards agreements concluded with the Agency, which is the entity with sole responsibility for verifying States parties' implementation of safeguards agreements. The Agency must preserve its impartiality and professional role, in accordance with its Statute;

(f) It should be emphasized that, as stated in Agency information circular 267 of March 1979 (INFCIRC/267), the technical assistance activities provided to Member States by the Agency should not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the Agency's Statute;

(g) The International Atomic Energy Agency should be called upon to increase the materials allocated for technical assistance to States parties and, in particular, the developing States;

(h) No new commitments for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be accepted until there has been genuine progress in achieving the universality of the Treaty, realizing nuclear disarmament, ensuring that all States parties comply with current commitments and, in particular, ensuring implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference;

(i) No technical support should be provided to States not parties to the Treaty, in accordance with articles I, II and III of the Treaty and in order to safeguard its purpose and credibility;

(j) The Agency should be called upon to halt the technical programmes provided to Israel. Cooperation with Israel on nuclear issues should be suspended until it accedes to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and places all its nuclear facilities under an International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive safeguards agreement. Those steps are a necessary precondition in order to promote the universality, credibility and effectiveness of the Treaty.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Exercise of the right of withdrawal contained in article X

Working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates)

1. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative states at the outset that seeking consensus regarding recommendations concerning the exercise of the right of withdrawal, which article X confers on States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is eminently political in nature, not to underestimate its legal dimension.

2. As regards the legal dimension, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative reaffirms that article X cannot be considered in isolation from the remaining provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty is a normative corpus with a crucial purpose: to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and thus satisfy the security interests of all its States parties. Furthermore, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative underlines that the Treaty is widely recognized as a cornerstone of international security.

3. Therefore, the integrity and universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be maintained. To this end, it is important to take a holistic approach, both to encourage parties to remain in the Treaty and to discourage them from withdrawing. In order to encourage parties to remain and, for that matter, to discourage them to withdraw from the Treaty, the importance of the integrity and universality of the Treaty should be re-emphasized. Furthermore, in this context, tangible progress needs to be made in the implementation of the past commitments made within the framework of the Treaty, in particular the 2010 action plan, including nuclear disarmament, the negative security assurances, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles.

4. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative notes that article X provides States parties with the right to withdraw from the Treaty. It also gives them the possibility of deciding that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the

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Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of the State party which sees a need to withdraw.

5. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative underlines that the process to exercise the right of withdrawal is described in the Treaty. Article X provides that the withdrawing State shall give notice to all other parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council three months in advance. In addition, this notice must provide a description of reasons for withdrawal, which shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the withdrawing State regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests of security.

6. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative believes that the discussion on strengthening the process to exercise article X should increase emphasis on the legitimate security interests of all the other States parties in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative believes that the withdrawal of any State party becomes an extremely significant event for all the States parties remaining in the Treaty: universal adherence to the Treaty enhances its value as an instrument of collective security; lack of universal adherence diminishes that value. And since withdrawal from the Treaty is an extremely significant political event, it must also be given extremely significant attention and care by the States parties remaining in the Treaty.

7. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative recognizes that withdrawal is a right consistent with the law of treaties. The motivation underpinning the effort to strengthen the process to exercise this right is not to abolish it, but to safeguard the interests of the parties that stay in the Non-Proliferation Treaty: their interests are no less supreme than those of the withdrawing State. Rights, whether individual or collective, are meaningful only through interaction with the rights of others. If the Treaty is really a cornerstone of international security, we should regard any withdrawal from it as a serious political action which, in addition to diminishing the security of the other States parties, may have a potentially disastrous impact on the security of all. States parties are entitled to withdraw, but all States parties are entitled to undiminished security.

8. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative underlines further the role given to the Security Council by the Treaty itself: article X requires the withdrawing party to give notice to the Council because such withdrawal constitutes an extraordinary event relevant to international security. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council should not remain silent after a withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty: under the Charter, it will be primarily responsible for determining whether that withdrawal constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

9. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative recalls that, in the discussions on the basic principles on the regulation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's withdrawal provisions at the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, one principle was derived from article 71 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: under international customary law a State continues to be responsible for any violation of its legal obligations committed prior to its withdrawal from a treaty.

10. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative firmly believes that the formulation of principles regarding the exercise of the right of withdrawal by a State and to protect the legitimate interests of all the other States parties does not constitute an amendment of the Treaty. Nevertheless, the Review Conference has authority to address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty using the mandate to look forward decided upon at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Initiative proposes to achieve such regulation within the framework of the Treaty and under the authority of the Review Conference.

11. The proposal below aims to preserve the integrity of the non-proliferation regime, the effectiveness of safeguards and the rights of the States parties remaining in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Those States — bilaterally or through membership in international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — may have engaged in cooperation under articles III and IV of the Treaty and may also, in good faith, have transferred materials, equipment and technology to a withdrawing State. It is vital that mechanisms remain in place on such items to ensure that they are not diverted to weapons programmes.

Principles regarding the exercise of the right of withdrawal

Mindful that withdrawal pursuant to article X of the Non-Proliferation Treaty may pose threats to international peace and security, and

Acknowledging that such threats are to be assessed — and eventually remedied — by the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

The exercise of the right of withdrawal under article X of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be governed by the following principles:

A. Withdrawal is a right for States parties under article X of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article X subjects this right to conditions and a time framework. Accordingly, the right to withdrawal can be exercised only in the face of extraordinary events related to subject matter of the Treaty and the withdrawing State party must give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties in the Treaty and to the Security Council three months in advance. Such notice must include a statement of the extraordinary events the withdrawing State regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

B. The right of withdrawal is governed by the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other relevant international law such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Under international law, a withdrawing party is still liable for violations of the Treaty perpetrated prior to the notification of withdrawal. Furthermore, withdrawal should not affect any right, obligation or legal situation between the withdrawing State and each of the other States parties created through the implementation of the Treaty prior to withdrawal, including those related to IAEA safeguards.

C. Recalling the Non-Proliferation Treaty's standing as a cornerstone of international security, depositories and States parties should undertake consultations and conduct every diplomatic effort to persuade the withdrawing State to reconsider its decision. In doing so, States parties should also address the legitimate security needs of the withdrawing party. Diplomatic initiatives at the regional level should be encouraged and supported.

D. Nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired by a State under article IV prior to withdrawal must remain under IAEA safeguards or fall-back safeguards even after withdrawal.

E. Nuclear supplying States parties are encouraged to exercise their sovereign right — in accordance with international law and their national legislation — to incorporate dismantling and/or return clauses or fall-back safeguards in the event of withdrawal, as appropriate, in contracts or any other arrangement concluded with other States parties. Nuclear supplying States parties are invited to adopt standard clauses for the dismantling and/or return of materials, equipment and other relevant goods from a withdrawing party.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Working paper submitted by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. The Group is, therefore, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.

2. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty continues to consider the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) to be a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.

3. In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. The resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.

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4. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.

5. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to strengthen the integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco by reviewing the declarations that were formulated by the nuclear-weapon States parties to Additional Protocols I and II thereto, for possible withdrawal or modification.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while noting with satisfaction the convening of the first preparatory meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, which was held in Vienna on 27 April 2012, calls upon the States parties and signatories to those treaties to put in place further forms of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States.

8. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.